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INTRODUCTION 
“Access to justice” is a broad term that can be defined in different ways.  
In this volume alone we find different contributions which present different 
views of access to justice, and different answers to central normative ques-
tions concerning access to justice, such as how much access is appropriate, 
access to what exactly or access by whom.  The movement to increase 
access to justice has likewise taken different directions, including the de-
velopment of less formal forms of dispute resolution, simplification of legal 
processes, and the progress of in-court assistance to unrepresented litigants.  
Yet, traditionally, and for the most part, increasing access to justice has 
 
∗ Tom R. Tyler is a University Professor at New York University.  He teaches in the Psy-
chology Department and the Law School.  Nourit Zimerman is a J.S.D. student at New York 
University Law School. 
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been related to increased access to legal counsel.1  Having access to repre-
sentation by an attorney is considered a central means to increase individu-
als’ access to justice, i.e., access to legal institutions or to legal solutions to 
their problems. The ABA’s current proposal to institutionalize a right to 
counsel in certain civil cases continues this traditional movement.  It offers 
to deal with access problems by making legal services more accessible for 
greater parts of society and by framing access to counsel as an entitlement 
in more types of cases. 
This paper is written as part of the discussion around the Bar’s propos-
al.2  This conversation, we believe, presents an important opportunity to 
use empirical knowledge in order to revisit and explore anew some of the 
basic assumptions and features of the American legal system—features that 
are reflected in the proposal itself.  In particular, we wish to focus on the 
equation between access to counsel and access to justice and the realities 
and difficulties faced by laypeople within the legal process. 
The primary purpose of this paper is to explore a psychological perspec-
tive on some of the issues concerning access to justice in civil litigation.  
This is an attempt to present what the existing literature, as well as addi-
tional suggested research, can and should teach us about the psychological 
aspects of the access challenge in civil litigation and about the needs con-
cerning the expansion of the right to counsel to civil cases.  Hopefully, the 
psychological point of view will enrich the discussion around the bar’s 
proposal by focusing on the subjective experiences of represented and un-
represented litigants within the legal system.  We will present a discussion 
that is based on needs rather than rights, on the subjective perceptions of 
individuals rather than objective, and normative evaluations concerning the 
value of representation.  We are interested in the way individuals perceive 
the concept of “access”, and to what degree they actually feel they have 
gained, or been denied, access to justice and under which specific circums-
tances.  The values we will discuss are those procedural values that indi-
viduals identify with legal procedures that are fair and satisfactory.  Public 
views, we believe, are one factor that needs to be considered when thinking 
about policy change. 
 
 1. For a detailed discussion of the different stages and waves of the Access to Justice 
Movement, see Mauro Cappelletti & Bryant Garth, A World Survey, in 1 ACCESS TO JUST., 
21-54 (Mauro Cappelletti ed., 1978). 
 2. This paper was originally written for a presentation.  Tom R. Tyler & Nourit Zi-
merman, Address at the ABA Symposium: Real People, Real Needs, Real Solutions—
Access to Legal Representation in Civil Litigation (Dec. 4-5, 2008).  The symposium dealt 
with the ABA’s proposal to establish and institutionalize a right to counsel, at public ex-
pense, to low income persons in certain categories of civil adversarial proceedings involving 
basic human needs, such as issues of shelter, sustenance, safety, health, or child custody. 
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The bar’s proposal is obviously an important step towards increasing 
many individuals’ access to legal representation and to the courts.  This is 
particularly essential in view of the centrality of professionals in the Amer-
ican system—a centrality that disadvantages pro se litigants within the 
court system.  Yet, we will try to go beyond these obvious observations to 
provide a thicker understanding of the mixed psychological values that are 
attached to representation, direct participation or access to justice more 
generally. 
Looking into the pro se phenomenon, this paper will explore the lessons 
that can be learned from the experiences of the many individuals 
representing themselves in the American legal system today.  These lessons 
apply not only to the needs of this specific group (which is the target of the 
bar’s reform), but may illustrate more generally the centrality of lawyers in 
the American legal system, and how the advice of counsel, or lack thereof, 
influences those operating within the court system. 
Pragmatically speaking, looking at the bar’s proposal, it is the group that 
is currently denied access to lawyers, but which would have them under the 
proposed reform that is of the greatest interest here.  We can ask how the 
experiences and evaluations of this group would change if their access to 
lawyers improved.  The change might involve a greater likelihood that they 
would bring their problems to court and also the possibility that, in court, 
their experiences and outcomes would be different.  For example, these ex-
periences might be more positive because of the support of a professional 
attorney or, the representation by an attorney might carry some psychologi-
cal drawbacks since it requires one to give up on the opportunity for direct 
participation. 
Our interest in this paper will go beyond this specific group of self-
represented litigants to try to understand better the procedural values that 
matter to people and how they are related to having or not having profes-
sional legal representation.  We would distinguish several questions: The 
first is whether, and in what ways, having a lawyer or not having a lawyer 
influences the experiences of lay people operating within the legal system, 
their evaluations of the process and the system, and of the outcomes ob-
tained by them.  Reading the procedural justice literature we will ask how 
representation, or the lack thereof, is related to the procedural aspects iden-
tified by individuals as fair and just. 
The second question is whether, and to what degree, having or being de-
nied access to counsel influences one’s decision to take a problem into 
court (in cases in which a person might have either a legitimate legal claim 
or a frivolous claim). 
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The third question is whether feeling that one is denied access to a law-
yer and/or to court due to the inability to have legal representation has an 
influence upon non-lawyers.  What are the consequences when people feel 
that they are unable to obtain access to counsel?  Do people who have 
access to counsel necessarily use counsel, and how do people feel when 
they have access to counsel but decide not to use it? 
And finally, irrespective of why people do not have counsel, what can 
we say about the pro se experience and what can we learn from the ways in 
which non-lawyers and legal actors interact within the legal system. 
In the first part of the paper we will present and discuss the legal back-
ground and legal challenges presented by the pro se phenomenon, the cen-
trality of lawyers, and the connection between access to counsel and access 
to justice in the American legal system.  The second part is devoted to a re-
view and analysis of the empirical work on the questions we presented 
above.  We then close with some conclusions drawn from the existing data 
as well as a proposal for additional research. 
I.  BACKGROUND: UNREPRESENTED LITIGANTS IN A LAWYER-
DOMINATED ENVIRONMENT 
The American legal system relies heavily on the representation of liti-
gants by lawyers in court procedures.  Even more than other western legal 
systems, the American system is lawyer-dominated.3  At the heart of its 
procedures, it posits the lawyer,4 a professional trained to bring her client’s 
voice and interests before the court.  Within this legal scheme, lawyers 
serve both litigants and the system.  They serve the litigants by bringing le-
gal expertise and case management experience to bear on a particular case.  
They therefore provide a professional service that is believed to significant-
ly increase the chances of winning in a system that treats dispute resolution 
in an adversarial setting in which the best litigator wins.5  At the same time, 
 
 3. ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW 3 (First 
Harvard University Press 2003) (2001). 
 4. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not assign the litigant a structured role in 
the process.  Generally speaking, it seems that the rules “tacitly posit the lawyer as central,” 
Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedures in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494, 
537 (1986), to a degree that they “often make litigants . . . invisible.”  Judith Resnik, Revis-
ing the Canon: Feminist Help in Teaching Procedure, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 1181, 1193 
(1992).  If we look back to the history of the Rules, it seems that the fundamental role law-
yers played in the drafting process can explain, at least to some extent, the lawyer-centered 
orientation of the rules.  See Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedures in Decline, 53 
U. CHI. L. REV. 494, 503-05 (1986). 
 5. For the ways in which having legal representation actually influences outcomes, an 
issue we do not discuss here, see, in this volume: Russell Engler, Connecting Self-
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the work of lawyers serves the basic structure of the adversary system,6 al-
lowing judges to preserve a passive role and sparing them the potential 
complexities of dealing with unprofessional litigants who are not invested 
in long-term relations with other legal actors that motivate people to adhere 
to rules of appropriate conduct when dealing with legal authorities. 
The American legal system ascribes great importance to the right of in-
dividuals to participate in legal procedures, and to have their “day in 
court.”7 Yet, as lawyers develop a greater role in the system, the legal 
process becomes more professionalized and complex and, when the proce-
dural design assumes representation, the ability of individuals to actually 
proceed successfully without an attorney, or to directly participate when 
they do have an attorney, diminishes. 
From here follows the equation between access to counsel and access to 
justice: being represented by an attorney is considered a central require-
ment for meaningful access to the American justice system.  Moreover, re-
presentation by a lawyer in itself has gradually been thought of as an essen-
tial aspect of due process rights and the right of participation in legal 
procedures.  As noted by the Supreme Court, “‘[t]he right to be heard 
would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to 
be heard by counsel.’”8  Therefore, while the ideal of participation in legal 
proceedings can be interpreted and implemented in different ways,9 this po-
 
Representation to Civil Gideon: What Existing Data Reveal About When Counsel is Most 
Needed, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 37, 44-66 (2010); Paula Hannaford-Agor & Nicole Mott, 
Research on Self-Represented Litigation: Preliminary Results and Methodological Consid-
erations, 24 JUST. SYS. J. 163, 170-71 (2003). 
 6. MIRJAN R. DAMAŠKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY 3 (1986). 
 7. The conventional understanding of having one’s “day in court” seems to be one of 
personal participation. “Because the English and United States constitutional traditions in-
itially made political commitments to due process within the framework of individual litiga-
tion, the relationship between process and individual participation was straightforward.  The 
rights to notice and to be heard belonged to an individual who had the opportunity to partic-
ipate.”  Judith Resnik, Dennis E. Curtis & Deborah R. Hensler, Individuals Within the Ag-
gregate: Relationships, Representation, and Fees, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 296, 358-59 (1996); 
see also Robert G. Bone, Rethinking the “Day in Court” Ideal and Nonparty Preclusion, 67 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 193, 204 (1992). 
 8. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 270 (1970) (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 
45, 68-69 (1932)). 
 9. Participation in legal procedures can have different meanings and take different 
forms.  It can be direct participation that includes face-to-face interaction with the decision-
maker, or be mediated by a representative.  It can be understood more or less broadly.  The 
scope and essence of participation will greatly depend on the different values and goals one 
attributes to the legal process itself.  See, e.g., Christopher J. Peters, Adjudicative Speech 
and the First Amendment, 51 UCLA L. REV. 705, 707-08 (2004). See generally Christine B. 
Harrington, The Politics of Participation and Nonparticipation in Dispute Processes, 6 LAW 
& POL’Y 203 (1984). 
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sition reflects the way in which the traditional, and dominant, view ended 
up interpreting it as being truly achieved only through representation by a 
professional. 
In reality though, despite the centrality of representation in the design of 
legal processes, the cost of legal services today is such that many people 
cannot afford to hire a lawyer.10  Responding to that reality, the proposal to 
institutionalize a right to counsel in civil cases tries to improve the existing 
structure by creating a level playing field where all litigants enjoy similar 
professional assistance.  Providing an attorney to people could bring more 
individuals to the courts and improve the prospect of those individuals who 
already turn to the courts representing themselves. 
We find these individuals, in increasing numbers, proceeding pro se in 
more and more courts and cases across the country. Indeed, pro se litigants 
are becoming a more common phenomenon in American courts, especially 
in the area of family law, and in “poor people courts” which deal with cases 
such as traffic or landlord/tenant disputes, where the pro se litigant has ac-
tually become the norm.11 
 
 10. Most low-income and moderate-income individuals cannot afford the cost of coun-
sel.  An ABA legal needs study reports that nearly 71% of legal situations facing low-
income households in America do not find their way into the justice system.  See JONA 
GOLDSCHMIDT ET AL., STATE JUSTICE INST., MEETING THE CHALLENGE OF PRO SE LITIGA-
TION: A REPORT AND GUIDEBOOK FOR JUDGES AND COURT MANAGERS 10 11, n.26 (1998) 
(citing ABA CONSORTIUM ON LEGAL SERVICES AND THE PUBLIC, LEGAL NEEDS AND CIVIL 
JUSTICE: A SURVEY OF AMERICANS – MAJOR FINDINGS FROM THE COMPREHENSIVE LEGAL 
NEEDS STUDY (1994)).  In a study conducted in California in 2005, 69% of those inter-
viewed indicated that attorney cost had or might prevent them from going to court.  DAVID 
ROTTMAN, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, TRUST AND CONFIDENCE IN THE CALIFORNIA 
COURTS 2005: A SURVEY OF THE PUBLIC AND ATTORNEYS 19-20 available at http://www. 
courtinfo.ca.gov/reference/documents/4_37pubtrust1.pdf.  See also Drew A. Swank, In De-
fense of Rules and Roles: The Need to Curb Extreme Forms of Pro Se Assistance and Ac-
commodation in Litigation, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 1537, 1541-46 (2005). 
 11. Some numbers for example: a California report from 2004 found that 4.3 million 
court users were self-represented in California.  In family law cases, 67% of petitioners were 
self-represented.  In a study of domestic relation cases in Arizona, at least one of the parties 
was pro se in almost 90% of the cases, and in 52% both parties were pro se.  In other types 
of civil cases the numbers are much lower, but still not negligible.  A study from 1995 of 
forty-five urban trial courts found that an average of 3% of all tort cases involved at least 
one pro se litigant.  In a Chicago study from 1994 pro se cases constituted 28% of all lan-
dlord-tenant cases.  In 1995, 25% of all new civil suits were brought pro se.  And the num-
bers seem to keep growing.  For more data, see GOLDSCHMIDT ET AL., supra note 10; JOHN 
M. GREACEN, CTR. FOR FAMILIES, CHILDREN AND THE COURTS, SELF REPRESENTED LITI-
GANTS AND COURT AND LEGAL SERVICES RESPONSES TO THEIR NEEDS: WHAT WE KNOW 
(2003), available at www.courtinfo.ca.gov/programs/cfcc/pdffiles/SRLwhatweknow.pdf; 
NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, PRO SE STATISTICS (2006) available at http://www. 
ncsconline.org/wc/publications/memos/prosestatsmemo/htm.  On the growth of pro se litiga-
tion in divorce cases, see Lynn Mather, Changing Patterns of Legal Representation in Di-
vorce: From Lawyers to Pro Se, 30 J. L. & SOC’Y 137, 142 (2003). 
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Pro se litigants present a very interesting exception to what is still re-
garded as the paradigmatic case in court procedures—a dispute resolution 
process that is dominated by professionals.  Indeed, the encounter between 
lay people and the legal system is challenging for both sides, and pro se li-
tigants are usually perceived as a problem—both to the courts and to them-
selves.  From the litigants’ side, there are the obvious difficulties of having 
to manage within a highly professionalized system whose rules, language 
and practices they do not know.  There is the fear then that pro se litigants’ 
rights and interests are left unprotected. 
From the courts’ side, pro se litigants are considered a burden; the need 
to deal directly with litigants (rather than professionals) requires modifica-
tions in routine processes and court personnel to deviate from their tradi-
tional roles12 and provide additional assistance.  Therefore, pro se litigants 
are often attacked for clogging the courts and creating judicial inefficien-
cies.13  Various reports indicate that there are burdens presented by pro se 
litigants, such as clerk time required to answer their questions and assist 
them and judicial time required to explain trial procedures and assist in the 
presentation of evidence.14 
The extent of the pro se phenomenon reveals a tension between the way 
the system is designed (based on the assumption of representation) and the 
realities with which it is dealing now (a huge percentage of unrepresented 
litigants).15  In addition to the attempts to increase access to counsel, then, 
we suggest that the width of the pro se phenomenon and the challenges it 
presents, the various reasons that bring people to represent themselves, and 
the realities faced by them, also require us to rethink the meaning of, and 
connection between, access to counsel and access to justice. 
 
 12. One central problem in this context is the tension between judicial impartiality, a 
central feature of the adversarial process, and the need for judges to assist pro se litigants.  
See generally Cynthia Gray, Reaching Out or Overreaching: Judicial Ethics and Self-
Represented Litigants, 27 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 97 (2007); Richard Zorza, 
The Disconnect Between the Requirements of Judicial Neutrality and Those of the Appear-
ance of Neutrality when Parties Appear Pro Se: Causes, Solutions, Recommendations, and 
Implications, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 423 (2004). 
 13. Interestingly, studies have actually found that represented-party cases are the most 
time consuming and that in some types of cases (such as family cases), the presence of self-
represented litigants actually speeds procedures and requires fewer resources.  Also, studies 
have found that pro se cases were being settled at the same rates as those with represented 
parties, refuting the notion that pro se cases always go to trial and never settle.  See, e.g., 
Drew A. Swank, The Pro Se Phenomenon, 19 BYU J. PUB. L. 373, 384-85 (2005); see also 
GREACEN, supra note 11, at 10-11. 
 14. See GREACEN, supra note 11, at 12; John. M. Greacen, Framing the Issues for the 
Summit on the Future of Self-Represented Litigation, in THE FUTURE OF SELF-REPRESENTED 
LITIGATION: REPORT FROM THE MARCH 2005 SUMMIT 19, 20 (2005). 
 15. See supra note 11. 
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Obviously, access to justice has different meanings and interpretations.16  
Access could relate to the process through which a certain grievance is 
turned into a legal claim and brought before the court.  It could relate to fi-
nancial barriers that prevent individuals from bringing a case before the 
court system.  Access to justice is not just a formal concept; it relates also 
to what happens within the court.  Access to justice should be understood 
to include what happens when lay people interact with the court system, 
and the degree to which they can have meaningful legal redress.  Such 
meaningful legal redress, i.e. obtaining justice in legal terms, is traditional-
ly the primary focus of discussions of access to justice.  In addition, we will 
argue, the pro se litigant’s experience during the process should be in-
cluded in the discussion, and is important because it shapes both the wil-
lingness to accept the outcome and the feeling that “justice was done”, as 
well as the opinions that those involved in the system form about judges, 
lawyers, the courts, and the legal system. 
On the one hand, in a system in which legal knowledge and experience 
is important, it would be easy to assume that people want, and are more sa-
tisfied when they receive, professional legal representation.  On the other 
hand, having a lawyer to speak on one’s behalf also means that one does 
not (in fact normally cannot) speak for oneself.  Hence, a represented party 
loses the opportunity to directly address the decision-maker, ceding that 
right to the attorney.  Under the current design of the system, the 
represented litigant loses any structured role in the process; the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure do not assign the litigant himself any structured 
opportunities to speak before the court other than if he chooses to testify.  
Likewise, the Rules do not require the litigant’s own signature on most 
documents submitted to the court,17 and do not even require the litigant’s 
 
 16. See, e.g., DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE 3-19, 47-68 (2004); Stephen L. 
Pepper, Access to What?, 2 J. INST. STUD. LEG. ETH. 269, 269-70 (1999) (Pepper distin-
guishes between two meanings of “access to justice”: the first refers to “the distribution of 
lawyer services in regard to litigation, and in the attendant negotiations of disputes prior to 
litigation,” and the second “focus[es] not just on litigation and dispute resolution, but on 
access to legal advice more generally”); Deborah L. Rhode, Equal Justice Under Law: Con-
necting Principle to Practice, 12 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 47 (2003).  See also Lois Bloom & 
Helen Hershkoff, Federal Courts, Magistrate Judges, and the Pro Se Plaintiff, 16 NOTRE 
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 475, 476 (2002) (“The literature on access to justice gener-
ally uses the term ‘legal assistance’ to mean the provision of counsel, whether subsidized by 
the government or compensated by contingency fee or other arrangement, to a party who 
cannot afford representation.  Access to justice, however, should also entail other forms of 
legal assistance, including a court structure that responds fairly and efficiently to claimants 
who lack the legal equipage needed to present their cases in an effective way.”). 
 17. FED. R. CIV. P. 11. 
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presence in pretrial conferences, which are meant to enhance the manage-
ment of the dispute and possibly facilitate its settlement.18 
The level of involvement of the represented litigant depends then on his 
lawyer (who can work less or more to inform the client and have him in-
volved in the process), on the judicial attitude and methods of the court, 
and on the desires and abilities of the litigant himself.19  In reality then, the 
difference in the experience of represented and unrepresented litigants 
could be as big as the difference between complete reliance on one’s attor-
ney and having no active involvement in the legal process, on the one hand, 
and having complete independence in the management of the litigation, 
with no professional assistance, on the other. 
This gap might be mitigated if we think of different lawyering strategies 
and modifications in the court environment that would allow greater partic-
ipation on behalf of represented litigants, and more support and assistance 
to unrepresented litigants.  Before discussing such potential changes, how-
ever, we want to examine what is currently known about the psychological 
experiences of those who are and are not represented by lawyers. 
II.  THE SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE OF LITIGANTS: EMPIRICAL 
FINDINGS TO DATE 
Our concern in this section is with one specific subset of the empirical li-
terature on trials; it is with what we know about parties’ subjective expe-
riences during trials and, in particular, whether those experiences are linked 
to their access to, and/or use of, lawyers.  The following is a review of what 
the existing literature, especially in the area of procedural justice, reveals 
 
 18. FED. R. CIV. P. 16.  Even outside the courtroom, represented clients usually play a 
very small role in negotiations leading to settlement, as these are usually managed by their 
lawyers.  See Jean R. Sternlight, Lawyers’ Representation of Clients in Mediation: Using 
Economics and Psychology to Structure Advocacy in a Nonadversarial Setting, 14 OHIO ST. 
J. ON DISP. RESOL. 269, 333 (1999). 
 19. The procedural design, as well as the prevalent lawyer-client relationship, result in 
many represented litigants having little control and involvement in the litigation process.  In 
a Rand study that dealt with tort litigants, a majority reported having little control over their 
cases. LIND ET AL., THE PERCEPTION OF JUSTICE: TORT LITIGANTS’ VIEWS OF TRIAL, COURT-
ANNEXED ARBITRATION, AND JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT CONFERENCES 69 (1989).   Most litigants 
attributed this to the lawyer, the court, or both.  Less than 10% regarded their lack of control 
as resulting from their own choice.  Deborah R. Hensler, The Real World of Tort Litigation, 
in EVERYDAY PRACTICES AND TROUBLE CASES 155, 164-65 (Austin Sarat ed., 1998).  This 
finding is in accord with other data indicating that litigants feel that they lack control over 
the legal process.  Kritzer, reporting the results of the Civil Litigation Research Project, also 
concludes that “control rests largely with the lawyer, particularly when the client is an indi-
vidual,” and that “clients simply are not very involved in most cases.”  HERBERT M. KRITZ-
ER, THE JUSTICE BROKER: LAWYERS AND ORDINARY LITIGATION 60, 62 (1990). 
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about the experiences, perceptions and expectations of individuals concern-
ing justice, fairness and the legal process—with or without the assistance of 
an attorney. 
In 1975 John Thibaut, a psychologist, and Laurens Walker, a lawyer, 
published their pioneering book Procedural Justice.20  That monograph re-
ported on their empirical studies of the experience of people involved in 
dispute resolution proceedings, and made the claim that the perceived pro-
cedural justice of legal procedures shaped people’s reactions to them.  This 
procedural justice argument—that people care about procedural values no 
less than they care about outcomes, and that procedural values play a sig-
nificant role in people’s evaluations of, and satisfaction with, procedures in 
which they have participated—is now widely supported by a large body of 
empirical studies.21 
The procedural justice literature has shown that people’s concerns about 
procedural values exist independently of whether they win or lose, that 
people look for more than winning in their interactions with the legal sys-
tem, and that they evaluate the fairness of legal processes according to a 
large variety of criteria.22  The argument is that: 
What law has summarized under the “due process” rubric, social scientists 
capture as a bundle of interests, needs, or wants described in a variety of 
ways—vindication, attention, accountability, information, accuracy, com-
fort, respect, recognition, dignity, efficacy, empowerment, [and] justice  
. . . .  Research on litigants . . . reveals a group of individuals who seek 
something in addition to money.23 
Research indicates that procedural values not only influence individuals’ 
evaluations of the fairness of any specific process, but that greater per-
ceived fairness also enhances “voluntary acceptance of decisions, voluntary 
compliance with legal rules, and the willingness to proactively help society 
 
 20. See generally JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSY-
CHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (1975). 
 21. For example, a study of tort litigants found that “objective case outcomes, costs of 
litigation and time to disposition contribute less to plaintiffs’ satisfaction with the litigation 
process than perceived fairness of the process.”  Resnik et al., supra note 7, at 372.  For re-
view of additional studies see: E. Allan Lind & Tom R. Tyler, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF 
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1988); E. Allan Lind et al., Procedure and Outcome Effects on Reac-
tions to Adjudicated Resolution of Conflicts of Interest, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
643 (1980). 
 22. See, e.g., TOM R. TYLER, ROBERT J. BOECKMANN, HEATHER J. SMITH & YUEN J. HUO, 
SOCIAL JUSTICE IN DIVERSE SOCIETY 88 (1997) [hereinafter TYLER ET AL., SOCIAL JUSTICE]; 
Tom R. Tyler, What is Procedural Justice?: Criteria Used by Citizens to Assess the Fair-
ness of Legal Procedures, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 103 (1988). 
 23. Resnik et al., supra note 7, at 363-64. 
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and social authorities.”24  In other words, perceived procedural fairness en-
hances the perceived legitimacy of legal institutions as well as citizens’ 
commitment to the law.25 
An example of the findings of procedural justice in that respect can be 
drawn from a study of public willingness to accept judicial decisions in two 
California communities—Oakland and Los Angeles.26  This study consi-
dered both those who came to these authorities seeking help, and those be-
ing regulated by the authorities.  The sample included 1,656 people in Los 
Angeles and Oakland with a recent personal experience with the police or 
the courts.  Fourteen percent (239 people) had contact with a court.27 
Why did people who dealt with the courts accept court decisions?  The 
study asked participants about their willingness to accept such decisions.  
In particular, it focused on willing acceptance, rather than mere com-
pliance.  It also asked about participants’ overall evaluations of the law, the 
courts, and the legal system.28 
Reactions to the court could potentially be linked to three judgments 
people made about their personal experiences in court: whether the proce-
dures used by the court were just; whether the outcome was just; and/or 
whether the outcome was favorable.29  Researchers applied a regression 
analysis to explore the influence of these various factors on the willingness 
to accept decisions made by the court.30  As expected by the procedural jus-
tice argument, the primary factor shaping the willingness to accept deci-
sions was the perceived fairness of court procedures.31  Procedural justice 
was also the primary factor shaping the influence of personal experience 
upon overall views about the court system.32  What is striking is that proce-
 
 24. TYLER ET AL., SOCIAL JUSTICE, supra note 22, at 82.  It is also argued that procedures 
that are evaluated as fair by all participants, “facilitate[] the maintenance of positive rela-
tions among group members and preserves the fabric of society, even in the face of the con-
flict of interest . . . .”  Id. at 99. 
 25. See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler & Kenneth Rasinski, Procedural Justice, Institutional Legi-
timacy, and the Acceptance of Unpopular U.S. Supreme Court Decisions: A Reply to Gib-
son, 25 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 621 (1991). 
 26. TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC COOPERA-
TION WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS 28 (2002). 
 27. The rest had contact with the police. Id. at 33. 
 28. Id. at 28. 
 29. Id. at 54. 
 30. In addition, the study measured and controlled for other potentially important fac-
tors, including the person’s ideology, age, level of education, income, gender, city of resi-
dence, ethnicity (African-American, Hispanic, white); and whether the person appeared in 
court voluntarily. 
 31. TYLER & HUO, supra note 26, at 54-57. 
 32. Id. at 55. 
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dural justice overwhelms other factors, explaining three to four times as 
much of the variance in both decision acceptance and court evaluations. 
The findings noted above are especially important because they are true 
of people irrespective of their social or economic background.  The Cali-
fornia study was designed to compare the experiences of White, Hispanic, 
and African-American residents of Los Angeles and Oakland.  The mem-
bers of all three groups reacted in basically the same ways to their expe-
riences.  The same is true of those who were economically advantaged and 
disadvantaged, men and women, and those with varying degrees of educa-
tion. It was also true of plaintiffs and defendants, and of people who dealt 
with the police or the courts.33  In other words, people generally reacted to 
their experience in terms of procedural justice whatever their background, 
suggesting that focusing on procedural justice is a very good way to build 
trust and encourage compliance irrespective of who is using the courts. 
The strong link between procedural justice and evaluations of the courts 
was recently affirmed by another study conducted within the State Courts 
of California.  The Administrative Office of the Courts undertook a study 
in 2005 in which a random sample of the residents of the state was inter-
viewed about trust and confidence in the California courts.  An analysis of 
that information34 suggests that “[h]aving a sense that court decisions are 
made through processes that are fair is the strongest predictor by far of 
whether members of the public approve of or have confidence in the Cali-
fornia courts.”35  The California courts are rated as being very fair in terms 
of treating people with dignity and respect, but not particularly fair in terms 
of allowing them to participate in decisions that affect them.  The report ar-
gues that “[p]olicies that promote procedural fairness offer the vehicle with 
the greatest potential for changing how the public views the state courts.”36  
Interestingly, the report points to experiences with low-stakes courts, such 
as traffic court, as a particular source of dissatisfaction.  It goes on to argue 
that all experiences with legal authorities, even relatively trivial interac-
tions, are important to members of the public and need to be the focus of 
court-design efforts.37 
 
 33. Id. at 141-64. 
 34. ROTTMAN, supra note 10.  Analyses of the data from that survey which are presented 
in this article are from Tom R. Tyler & David Rottman, Public Views about the California 
Courts (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).  Both are based on a study of Califor-
nia state residents that involved interviews with a sample of 2414 people. 
 35. ROTTMAN, supra note 10, at 6. 
 36. Id. at 7. 
 37. One reason that these findings are particularly important is that they provide an in-
dependent confirmation that procedural justice issues matter in real court settings.  This 
study was not conducted or evaluated by the academic researchers who have been responsi-
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These procedural justice findings point to the centrality of process issues 
in the reactions of litigants to their experiences in court.  They suggest that 
issues of “due process,” as these are perceived by the public, are the key to 
creating and sustaining trust and confidence in the courts.  Hence, the find-
ings reinforce the value of viewing the issue of access to counsel within 
this general framework of creating a litigation experience that involves a 
fair procedure—perceived as such—for resolving disputes.  The question 
remains: what are the elements that make such a process and how are they 
connected to providing people with an attorney?  In other words, the value, 
goals, and quality of legal representation should be examined in view of the 
set of criteria people use to evaluate their legal experience, in addition to 
the outcomes obtained by them. 
 
ble for many of the early studies of procedural justice.  Instead, the need for this study arose 
within the framework of court concerns in California; the study was designed and conducted 
within the framework of the administrative offices of the courts, and the report was written 
by David Rottman, a researcher at the National Center for State Courts.  Similar conclusions 
have also been reached by other judicial leaders.  The white paper on procedural fairness 
authored by Judges Kevin Burke and Steve Leben, is another example.  KEVIN BURKE & 
STEVE LEBEN, AM. JUDGES ASS’N, PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS: A KEY INGREDIENT IN PUBLIC SA-
TISFACTION (2007) available at http://aja.ncsc.dni.us/htdocs/AJAWhitePaper9-26-07.pdf.  
Another white paper reviews research on procedural justice, including recent studies con-
ducted within the court systems of Hennepin County, Minnesota, under Judge Burke’s di-
rection, and in Brooklyn, New York.  M. SOMJEN FRAZER, THE IMPACT OF THE COMMUNITY 
COURT MODEL ON DEFENDANT PERCEPTIONS OF FAIRNESS: A CASE STUDY AT THE RED HOOK 
COMMUNITY JUSTICE CENTER (2006), available at http://courtinnovation.org/_uploads/ 
documents/Procedural_Fairness.pdf.  Again, these court-designed and sponsored evaluations 
point to the importance of procedural justice in encouraging satisfaction, decision accep-
tance, and trust and confidence in the courts.  See M. Somjen Frazer, Examining Defendant 
Perceptions of Fairness in the Courtroom, 91(1) JUDICATURE 36 (2007); Jake Horowitz, 
Making Every Encounter Count: Building Trust and Confidence in the Police, 256 NAT’L 
INST. JUST. J. 8 (2007) available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/jr000256c. 
pdf. 
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A. Procedural Justice Criteria: Voice, Representation, and 
Participation38 
Whether people have an attorney has not been generally studied within a 
procedural justice framework, and the question of legal representation has 
not been significantly investigated.  As we discuss below, however, re-
search does confirm that the ability to be represented before the court, with 
or without counsel, is central to designing procedures that people view as 
fair. 
Thibaut and Walker identified the opportunity to present one’s argu-
ments to the decision-maker (which they term “control”) as central to indi-
viduals’ evaluations of the fairness of trial procedures.39  Since the publica-
tion of their work, a large body of literature has developed on people’s sub-
subjective evaluations of both trials and of more informal legal procedures.  
That literature suggests that people value the opportunity to present their 
arguments to legal authorities in either a formal or an informal legal proce-
dure.  The original research, however, did not address the distinction be-
tween personally presenting arguments, and evidence and indirect represen-
tation through an attorney.  For example, in their work, Thibaut and Walker 
do not distinguish between situations where there is some control in the 
hands of the disputant himself and situations where the control is solely in 
the hands of the lawyer.  Moreover, they do not include the role of the law-
yer in their basic model of dispute.  They explain this absence by saying 
that due to their professional expertise lawyers can only increase the liti-
gant’s perceived control over the process.40 
Irrespective of whether it is direct or indirect, there is a great deal of evi-
dence suggesting that people want voice in legal proceedings and react to 
the extent that they do or do not receive it.41  Evidence for the value of 
 
 38. The terms that we use here—voice, participation, and representation—are common 
terms in the procedural justice literature, but they are often used to mean different things.  In 
this article we use voice to relate to self expression opportunities in which the litigant is al-
lowed to express his concerns and views with regard to the problem at hand.  Voice is typi-
cally used to refer to a more direct form of participation, such as occurs when a person di-
rectly addresses the decision-maker.  Participation is a somewhat broader term that relates 
to all of the ways in which one can play a role in the dispute resolution process (including 
voice).  We use representation to relate generally to the extent and ways in which the liti-
gant’s case is presented before the decision-maker (it could relate either to representation by 
an attorney or to self representation). 
 39. For an elaborated discussion of this conclusion, see THIBAUT & WALKER, supra note 
20, at 117-24. 
 40. John Thibaut & Laurens Walker, A Theory of Procedure, 66 CAL. L. REV. 541, 547 
n.14 (1978). 
 41. The first to use the term “voice” as an element of procedural justice evaluations was 
Robert Folger, who defined having a voice in a system as “having some form of participa-
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voice comes from studies concerning which aspects of the court experience 
litigants associate with justice.  The aspects found to most strongly influ-
ence the experience of litigants are voice, neutrality, respect, and trust. 
Voice/Representation.  People want to have the opportunity to present 
their side of the story in their own words, before decisions are made about 
how to handle the dispute or problem.  Having an opportunity to voice their 
perspective has a positive effect upon people’s experience with the legal 
system irrespective of their outcome, as long as they feel that the authority 
sincerely considered their arguments before making a decision.  The value 
people place on the ability to “tell their story” reappears in various studies.  
For example, a study of small claims courts found that the opportunity for 
direct, unmitigated participation—especially the opportunity for the litigant 
to tell his story before a judge—was an important determinant of the liti-
gant’s satisfaction. 42  Again, however, this literature mostly does not dis-
tinguish between directly voicing one’s concerns and presenting one’s evi-
dence and having this occur through one’s attorney. 
Neutrality.  People bring their disputes to the court because they view 
judges as neutral, principled decision-makers, who make decisions based 
upon rules and not personal opinions, and who apply legal rules consistent-
ly across people and over cases.43  To emphasize this aspect of the court 
experience, judges should be transparent and open about how the rules are 
being applied and how decisions are being made.  Explanations emphasiz-
ing the application of relevant rules are helpful. 
 
tion in decision making by expressing one’s own opinion.”  Robert Folger, Distributive and 
Procedural Justice: Combined Impact of “Voice” and Improvement on Experienced Inequi-
ty, 35 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 108, 109 (1977).  Following Folger, literature in the 
field began using the term voice, sometimes defined as “an opportunity to express [the indi-
vidual’s] position before a decision is made,” or as the ability of the disputant to tell his sto-
ry and present his arguments.  Blair H. Sheppard, Justice is No Simple Matter: Case for 
Elaborating our Model of Procedural Fairness, 49 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 952, 
954 (1985); Tom R. Tyler, Kenneth A. Rasinski & Nancy Spodick, Influence of Voice on 
Satisfaction with Leaders: Exploring the Meaning of Process Control, 48 J. PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 72 (1985). 
 42. William M. O’Barr & John M. Conley, Litigant Satisfaction Versus Legal Adequacy 
in Small Claims Court Narratives, 19 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 661, 677 (1985) (noting that 
“[l]itigants uniformly take advantage of the opportunity to talk . . . and some even offer un-
solicited unfavorable comments about this aspect of the procedure”). 
 43. TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 137 (1990). An example of the impor-
tance of respect can be found in another study which found that, “litigants’ assessment of 
procedural fairness was not based on whether they had an opportunity to participate in the 
process (e.g. vent), but rather on their perceptions of the carefulness and neutrality of the 
third party and the dignity of the process.”  Deborah R. Hensler, Suppose It’s Not True: 
Challenging Mediation Ideology, 2002 J. DISP. RESOL. 81, 95 (2002). 
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Respect.  Legal authorities, whether police officers, court clerks, or 
judges, represent the state and communicate important messages to people 
about their status in society.  Respect for people and their rights affirm to 
people that they are viewed as important and valuable, and are included 
within the rights and protections that form one aspect of the connection that 
people have to government and law.  People want to feel that when they 
have concerns and problems both they and their problems will be taken se-
riously by the legal system. 
Respect matters at all stages, and involves police officers and court 
clerks as well as judges.  It includes both treating people well, that is, with 
courtesy and politeness, and showing respect for people’s rights.44  For ex-
ample, when people come to court they are often confused about how cases 
are handled.  Providing people with information about what to do, where to 
go, and when to appear, all demonstrate respect both for those people and 
for their right to have their problems handled fairly by the courts.  Bro-
chures or web sites explaining court procedures, as well as aids such as 
help desks are found to be valuable.45 
Trust.  Studies of legal and political authorities consistently show that 
the central attribute that influences public evaluations of legal authorities is 
an assessment of the character of the decision-maker.46  The key elements 
in this evaluation involve issues of sincerity and caring.  People infer 
whether they feel that court personnel, such as judges, are listening to and 
considering their views; are being honest and open about the basis for their 
actions; are trying to do what is right for everyone involved; and are acting 
in the interests of the parties, not out of personal prejudices. 
Using the data collected in the study of personal experiences with the 
courts in Oakland and Los Angeles discussed above, it is possible to ex-
amine the potential influence of these four antecedents of procedural jus-
tice.  An analysis of the four factors considered at the same time suggests 
that neutrality, trust, and respect directly shape overall evaluations of pro-
cedural justice, but that voice does not.  An analysis that allows both direct 
and indirect influences indicates, however, that voice is indirectly impor-
tant because it shapes evaluations about neutrality, trust, and respect. 
People who feel that they have voice, in other words, view the proce-
dures as more neutral, have more trust in the decision-maker, and feel that 
they have been treated with greater respect.  An analysis that considers both 
 
 44. See TYLER, supra note 43, at 138. 
 45. See GREACEN, supra note 11, at 16-19. 
 46. See E. ALLAN LIND ET AL., THE INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, THE PERCEPTION OF 
JUSTICE: TORT LITIGANTS’ VIEWS OF TRIAL, COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION, AND JUDICIAL 
SETTLEMENT CONFERENCES 61-67 (1989); ROTTMAN, supra note 10, at 24. 
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direct and indirect influences at the same time indicates that all four factors 
matter, with voice having the strongest influence, followed respectively by 
neutrality, trust, and respect.  Interestingly, neither outcome favorability 
nor outcome fairness directly influences overall procedural justice judg-
ments.  This data supports the argument that having the opportunity to 
present one’s case leads people to feel that the forum is more neutral, the 
authorities more trustworthy, and the procedure more respectful of them 
and their rights.  For all of these reasons litigants are more likely to accept 
decisions and evaluate the legal system more favorably after they have ex-
perienced voice. 
B. Voice in Direct and Indirect Participation 
As we have noted, the opportunity to present one’s case can occur either 
directly, as in an informal legal procedure such as mediation, or as a pro se 
litigant in court, or indirectly through an attorney.  The attorney interviews 
her clients and organizes the arguments into a legally relevant, and hopeful-
ly compelling, presentation of the case. 
The key psychological issue raised by pro se litigation is whether people 
have different reactions to direct and indirect participation in legal proce-
dures.  A subsequent important question is how people evaluate and rate 
different factors that are influenced by direct or indirect participation, such 
as different levels of voice and control, different levels of knowledge and 
understanding of the legal process and their rights, or the support provided 
by having a professional on your side.  These are just a few of the many 
ways in which having or not having an attorney can influence the expe-
rience of a litigant. 
In order to answer these questions, in face of the limited data, we must 
understand the value of voice and the different effects it has on people’s le-
gal experiences.  In the original work of Thibaut and Walker, people’s de-
sire for voice was linked to their desire to present their arguments in a 
compelling way and thereby influence the judge to make a favorable deci-
sion.47  This argument is consistent with the suggestion that people want to 
have an attorney who can make a more compelling case on their behalf.  In 
its original incarnation, the Thibaut and Walker model is instrumental and 
suggests that one’s desire to speak is directly linked to the view that one’s 
 
 47. See THIBAUT & WALKER, supra note 20, at 117-24; Thibault & Walker, supra note 
40, at 524, 549. 
TYLER_CHRISTENSEN 3/12/2010  1:57 PM 
490 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXVII 
arguments can influence the court’s decision.48  It is easy to imagine that 
effective legal representation could facilitate such influence. 
As research on voice has developed, however, it has moved away from 
the instrumental view and increasingly emphasized people’s desire for per-
sonal recognition by authorities.49  Indeed, later work on the psychology of 
voice suggests that the experience of voice has interpersonal or “value-
expressive” worth that is not linked to any influence over the final deci-
sion.50  These studies show that people still rate a procedure to be more fair 
if they had voice (versus no voice), even if they know that what they said 
had little or no influence on the outcome of their proceeding.51  Even more 
strikingly, this holds true even when the opportunity for voice comes after 
the decision was already made.52  These findings demonstrate that voice 
has value beyond its ability to shape outcomes. 
What factors drive the influence of voice, besides influence over the 
eventual outcome or decision?  We might hypothesize that when an author-
ity listens to a person’s arguments, the authority confers interpersonal re-
spect on that person, acknowledging his rights as a citizen and as a person, 
and validating his status as a person in good standing in society.  This ar-
gument is supported by the finding that people only value such voice op-
portunities if they feel that the authority is “considering” their arguments.53  
This suggests that people focus on whether the decision-maker treats their 
concerns and needs in the situation with respect (by receiving good faith 
consideration), independently of whether the decision-maker adopts the 
course of action the people recommend to resolve those concerns. 
 
 48. THIBAUT & WALKER, supra note 20, at 118.  This instrumental view is also favored 
by other procedural justice researchers.  See, e.g., Gerald S. Leventhal, What Should Be 
Done With Equity Theory? New Approaches to the Study of Fairness in Social Relation-
ships, in SOCIAL EXCHANGE: ADVANCES IN THEORY AND RESEARCH 32 (K.J. Gergen, M.S. 
Greenberg & R. H. Willis eds., 1980). 
 49. E. Allen Lind, Ruth Kanfer & P. Christopher Earley, Voice, Control and Procedural 
Justice: Instrumental and Noninstrumental Concerns in Fairness Judgments, 59 J. PERSO-
NALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 952 (1990). 
 50. Tom R. Tyler, Conditions Leading to Value-Expressive Effects in Judgments of Pro-
cedural Justice: A Test of Four Models, 52 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 333, 333 
(1987). 
 51. Tyler et al., supra note 41. 
 52. Lind et al., supra note 49, at 957.  At the same time, it is important to note that voice 
with no influence might also heighten feelings of procedural injustice and dissatisfaction. 
“[W]hen people feel that their opportunity to speak is a ‘sham,’ rather than an honest oppor-
tunity to influence the decision, they may react to that opportunity with anger.”  Tyler et al., 
supra note 41, at 74. 
 53. Tyler, supra note 22. 
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To the degree that people see voice as communicating concern and con-
sideration by legal authorities, or as affirming their status and value, direct 
voice might be as desirable, or even more desirable, than representation by 
a lawyer.  No data exists, however, to clearly support this hypothesis.  The 
data presented here shows clearly that voice matters to people.  What is not 
clear is if it matters whether that voice is direct or indirect.  That distinction 
is central to the issue at hand here, since pro se litigation is direct participa-
tion in which people represent their own positions, by making their own ar-
guments and presenting their own evidence, whereas having an attorney 
constitutes mostly indirect participation.  As has been noted, there are 
plausible reasons for thinking that either direct or indirect participation 
might be experienced as the fairest procedure. 
One source of evidence about direct versus indirect voice is the compari-
son of trials and informal dispute resolution.  While the distinction is not 
absolute, people are more likely to have opportunities to directly voice their 
concerns to the decision-maker in alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”) 
procedures such as mediation.54  Studies of mediation suggest that it is 
popular among its participants, at least in comparison to traditional adjudi-
cation.55  This popularity is linked to the opportunities for direct participa-
tion in discussions about one’s case, as well as the opportunity to present 
arguments about one’s situation and needs.  Mediation research suggests 
that people like direct participation, at least in informal legal procedures.56  
For example, a recent experiment examining participants’ preferences for 
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms found that they preferred 
processes that allowed them to present evidence on their own behalf with-
out the help of a representative.57  The question remains though, whether 
litigants would prefer direct participation in more formal settings, where 
representation by a lawyer might carry different benefits than it does in 
mediation and other less formal settings. 
In trying to answer this question it is important to note that research 
about individuals’ preferences for different types of dispute resolution me-
 
 54. Sternlight, supra note 18, at 333. 
 55. The question of the popularity of mediation procedures is complicated. People do 
not tend to freely choose mediation over litigation. But, once they have participated in a 
mediation process they would demonstrate high levels of satisfaction with the process.  See 
Donna Shestowsky, Procedural Preferences in Alternative Dispute Resolution: A Closer, 
Modern Look at an Old Idea, 10 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 211 (2004) (reviewing studies 
of participants’ assessments of mediation);  see also Hensler, supra note 43 (questioning the 
use of mandatory mediation and litigants’ preference of non-adversarial procedures). 
 56. See generally Tom R. Tyler, The Psychology of Disputant Concerns in Mediation, 3 
NEGOTIATION J. 367 (1987). 
 57. Shestowsky, supra note 55. 
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chanisms does not provide clear answers, perhaps because it is difficult to 
compare different procedures on any one dimension.  While mediation and 
other alternative dispute resolution mechanisms are found to be popular 
among participants, they are not necessarily always evaluated as providing 
greater participation opportunities than trials, or as being fairer.  This issue 
was addressed in a study conducted by the RAND Corporation in which 
trials, court-annexed arbitration, and judicial settlement conferences were 
compared.58  Litigants in each procedure were asked to evaluate their op-
portunities for participation.  Interestingly, people rated their opportunities 
for participation as being highest in trials.  As the authors conclude: 
The procedure that is often asserted to offer little opportunity for direct li-
tigant involvement—trial—was in fact that which received the highest 
participation ratings among both defendants and plaintiffs. One explana-
tion might be that the process of preparing for trial and the experience of 
testifying at trial led to feelings of having participated in the litigation 
process.59 
The previously mentioned 2005 California court study of a random sam-
ple of Californians asked people to evaluate the courts on a number of di-
mensions.60  Voice (defined as being listened to) was among the lowest-
ranked dimension of the courts, with about 35% of those interviewed indi-
cating that the courts do not listen to people.61  This suggests that there is a 
widespread perception that people lack voice in the courts.  Among those 
with personal experience in courts, 38% indicated that courts do not listen, 
as compared to 30% among those without experience.62  Hence, people are 
more likely to say that courts do not listen to people if they have actually 
been to court.  Yet, the degree to which people evaluate procedures as pro-
viding voice can be based on various factors, including whether or not they 
were represented, as well as factors such as the attitudes of judges, the de-
 
 58. LIND ET AL., supra note 46. 
 59. Id. at 72. In this study, litigants were usually excluded from participating in the judi-
cial settlement conferences, which meant that they could not even witness the process 
through which decisions were made. This led more people to experience mistrust and dissa-
tisfaction with this process. 
 60. ROTTMAN, supra note 10, at 9. 
 61. Id. 
 62. See Tyler & Rottman, supra note 34.  Additional findings include: 20% of the public 
said that juries were not representative, 21% said that people were not treated with dignity, 
28% said that the courts do not make sure that judges follow the rules, and 31% said that the 
courts do not take peoples’ needs into account.  Rottman, supra note 10, at 9 (percentages 
estimated from Rottman’s bar graph).  Also, only 19% of respondents said that local judges 
were not honest, 29% said that local courts were out of touch with the community, and 34% 
said that the California courts do not protect everyone’s Constitutional rights.  Rottman, su-
pra note 10, at 32. 
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sign of court procedures, limitations imposed by evidence law, caseload, 
etc.  There is a need, then, to examine more closely the specific impact of 
representation on people’s evaluations of their court experiences. 
C. Does it Matter to People if They Have a Lawyer and in What 
Ways? 
Does it matter if people have a lawyer when they go to court?  It is poss-
ible that people with an attorney feel more able to effectively represent 
their case in court.  It is also possible, though, that people with an attorney 
feel denied the opportunity to speak their mind, leading them to feel less 
fairly treated.  This would suggest that pro se litigation might have the ben-
efit of giving people a stronger feeling of voice.  Obviously, when we 
speak here about the potential benefits of pro se litigation, we focus on 
those psychological benefits—i.e., those factors that better the subjective 
experiences of litigants.  We do not consider the questions of whether, and 
how much, having a lawyer betters the outcome obtained by litigants, or 
possible biases in the system against pro se litigants.63 
Tyler looked at how going to court with or without a lawyer influenced 
the litigation experience of individuals. He did so among a random sample 
of 1,575 of Chicago residents.64  Each person was asked if they had had re-
cent experience with legal authorities.  Of the 733 with recent experience, 
147 indicated that their most important recent experience was with a 
court.65  The study focused upon people’s subjective experience during 
their visit to the courts, not their objective outcomes.  It did not, for exam-
ple, examine whether lawyers obtained better outcomes for their clients.  
Instead it looked at how people evaluated their experience. 
Of the recent court users interviewed by Tyler, 29% had an attorney, and 
71% did not.  People were more likely to have a lawyer when they viewed 
the legal issues involved as serious (r = .35, p < .001) and if they were the 
plaintiff in the case (r = .29, p < .001).  Age, race, income, education, and 
gender did not, however, influence whether people had a lawyer. 
 
 63. For example, even in small claims courts, institutions designed with the intent to 
serve pro se litigants and provide simpler, cheaper, and more accessible legal services, stu-
dies have found that pro se litigants do not get as good results as represented litigants, and 
especially do not get good results when appearing against a represented litigant.  See Steven 
Weller, John C. Ruhnka, & John A. Martin, American Small Claims Courts, in SMALL 
CLAIMS COURTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 11 (Christopher J. Whelan ed., 1990). 
 64. TYLER, supra note 43, at 8.  The data reported is described in general terms but is 
reanalyzed by the authors for this paper. 
 65. Id. at 12. 
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The study looked at four judgments that people made about their expe-
rience.  First, people were asked whether they felt they had received a de-
sirable outcome.  Second, they were asked whether they felt that the proce-
dures were fair.  Third, they were asked whether they felt that they had an 
opportunity to present their case to the judge.  Fourth, they were asked 
about their feelings (anger, happiness, etc.) with regard to their experience 
with the courts. 
In each case regression analysis was used to examine the influence of 
whether people had a lawyer on the relevant evaluation, controling for the 
seriousness of the case and whether the person was the plaintiff.  That re-
gression analysis indicated that whether people had a lawyer did not signif-
icantly influence the following: whether they felt that their outcome was 
desirable; whether they believed that the procedures were fair; and whether 
they had an opportunity to present their case.  Finally, whether people had a 
lawyer did not influence their post-experience feelings.  In this study at 
least, controling upon case characteristics, there is no evidence that, wheth-
er people had a lawyer shaped their evaluations of their experience in 
court.66 
Similar findings emerge from a study of pro se divorce litigants in Ari-
zona, which found that self-represented litigants had the same level of posi-
tive reaction to their court experience as represented ones, while pro se liti-
gants had fewer dissatisfied and very dissatisfied reactions than represented 
litigants.  In other words, in the Arizona study self-representation lowered 
unfavorable reactions, but did not heighten favorable ones.67 
Going back to Tyler’s study, it is especially striking that there were no 
differences in the degrees to which people felt that they were able to 
present their evidence to the judge, since having a lawyer leads to a more 
indirect form of participation.  Hence, people did not indicate feeling de-
prived of voice via this indirect form of participation. 
Another study examining unrepresented litigants was conducted among 
Australian adults on trial for driving after drinking.  In the study, 397 adults 
who had courtroom trials were examined, of whom 138 had an attorney and 
259 did not.  Participants were asked to assess their court experiences.68 
 
 66. Id. at 137-38. If we ignore differences in seriousness, we find that people with law-
yers report more negative outcomes, less fair procedures, and more negative feelings, all 
possibly due to the fact that they have more difficult and serious cases. 
 67. GREACEN, supra note 11, at 4. 
 68. See generally Tom R. Tyler et al., Reintegrative Shaming, Procedural Justice, and 
Recidivism: The Engagement of Offenders’ Psychological Mechanisms in the Canberra 
RISE Drinking-and-Driving Experiment, 41 L. & SOC’Y REV. 553 (2007). 
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The results of the study suggest, first, that litigants did not believe that 
they received a worse outcome,69 or were more strongly pressured to accept 
an outcome,70 if they did not have a lawyer.  Those with a lawyer, however, 
did feel they better understood their rights,71 were treated with greater re-
spect,72 and were not disadvantaged during the trial.73  On the other hand, 
those without lawyers felt they had greater opportunity to speak.74  Interes-
tingly, though, this did not mean that they felt they had control over what 
happened,75 since those with lawyers felt more in control.  Finally, those 
with lawyers were more likely to say that their respect for law enforcement 
increased through their experience,76 and were found to have higher levels 
of perceived legitimacy than did those without lawyers.77 
These findings are similar to others noted in that the gains of having a 
lawyer are not necessarily linked to the actual outcome; they come through 
a sense of understanding what is happening and feeling comfortable in the 
courtroom setting.78  These feelings, at least in this study, meant that hav-
ing a lawyer was linked to higher levels of legitimacy and respect for the 
 
 69. The question was, “How severe was your sentence?”  The mean for represented liti-
gants was 2.31, and for those not represented it was 2.40 (t(305) = 0.84, not significant).  
The findings discussed in this paragraph come from the reanalysis of the dataset underlying 
Tyler et al., supra note 68. 
 70. The question was, “Were you pushed into accepting an outcome?”  The mean for 
represented litigants was 2.38, and for those not represented it was 2.45 (t(306) = 0.47, not 
significant). 
 71. The question was, “Did you understand your rights?”  The mean for represented liti-
gants was 3.68, and for those not represented it was 3.32 (t(306) = 2.82, p<.01). 
 72. The question was, “Were you treated with respect?”  The mean for represented liti-
gants was 3.68, and for those not represented it was 3.47 (t(306) = 1.68, p<.10). 
 73. The question was, “Would you say that you were not disadvantaged during the tri-
al?”  The mean for represented litigants was 2.95, and for those not represented it was 2.60 
(t(306) = 2.62, p<.01). 
 74. The question was, “You felt you had an opportunity to express your views?”  The 
mean for represented litigants was 3.38, and for those not represented it was 3.63 (t(306) = 
1.91, p<.10). 
 75. The question was, “You had enough control over the ways things were run in the 
conference/court?”  The mean for represented litigants was 3.07, and for those not 
represented it was 2.81 (t(305) = 1.91, p<.10). 
 76. The question was, “Would you say your respect for the police has gone up?”  The 
mean for represented litigants was 3.18, and for those not represented it was 2.97 (t(306) = 
2.25, p<.05). Tyler et al., supra note 68, at 580. 
 77. The question was, “Do you view the law as legitimate?”  The mean for represented 
litigants was 4.06, and for those not represented it was 3.86 (t(305) = 2.35, p<.05).  Id. at 
580. 
 78. See Mather, supra note 11, at 151-53; Karl Monsma & Richard Lempert, The Value 
of Counsel: 20 Years of Representation Before a Public Housing Eviction Board, 26 L. & 
SOC’Y REV. 627 (1992) (discussing the ways in which lawyers actually do or do not benefit 
their clients in different legal settings). 
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law.  Consistent with other studies, however, people also felt that when 
they had a lawyer they traded the opportunity to speak for other gains. 
To conclude thus far, none of the studies suggest that people represented 
by lawyers express lower levels of control over the outcome or dissatisfac-
tion with limited opportunities for voice, when compared with unrepre-
sented litigants.  Hence, the evidence supports the suggestion that indirect 
participation does not diminish the perception of voice.  Given the general 
value of voice, this is important.  The studies outlined suggest that people 
who go to court with or without lawyers have similar feelings about their 
voice during their trial experience.  Having a lawyer, however, may change 
other judgments, as the Australian study suggests. 
The possible advantages of having a lawyer, and the impact of legal re-
presentation on the experience of those participating in legal processes, are 
reinforced by a study of pretrial arbitration conducted by the RAND Corpo-
ration.79  The RAND study found differences in perceptions of fairness 
among represented and unrepresented litigants: 
Pro se respondents . . . were more likely than represented litigants to be-
lieve they had been treated unfairly, and more likely to be dissatisfied.  
They were also more likely than represented litigants to believe that the 
arbitrators’ decision was “unjust,” to perceive the arbitrators themselves 
as biased, and to report difficulty in gathering and submitting evidence re-
lated to their case. . . .  The differences between [represented and unrepre-
sented] litigant samples are not large enough to be statistically significant.  
Nevertheless, the generally negative shift in the distributions of pro se li-
tigants’ attitudes is a disturbing note.80 
In this study, the fifteen pro se respondents were less successful in 
achieving their desired outcomes compared to the fifty-one represented liti-
gants.  Thirty-nine percent of those represented were evaluated as having 
won in objective terms, while only 20% of the pro se litigants won their 
cases.81  In addition, as noted above, unrepresented litigants generally felt 
less fairly treated.  The report notes a number of problems with unrepre-
sented litigants—such as difficulty in understanding what was expected of 
them at hearings, difficulties in preparing a case that involved rele-
vant/admissible evidence,82 and problems resulting from their engaging in 
legally irrelevant actions while in court, behaviors that upset the arbitra-
 
 79. JANE W. ADLER, DEBORAH R. HENSLER & CHARLES E. NELSON, RAND CORP., SIM-
PLE JUSTICE: HOW LITIGANTS FARE IN THE PITTSBURGH COURT ARBITRATION PROGRAM 
(1983). 
 80. Id. at 72. 
 81. Id. at 73. 
 82. Id. at 72-74. 
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tors.83  These are all problems that can arise when people lack attorneys—
problems that can lead them, as the study reveals, to feel that they have 
been unfairly treated, and consequently might lead to general dissatisfac-
tion with the legal procedure.84  While the small size of the study85 prec-
ludes suggesting any systematic differences between represented and unre-
presented litigants, the findings do resonate with anecdotal evidence about 
the experience of pro se litigants, and with the general notion that pro se 
litigants encounter a great deal of difficulty and experience a lot of frustra-
tion. 
Indeed, frustration is a recurring theme in descriptions of the experiences 
of pro se litigants—frustration 
from delay; from distrust of opposing parties and counsel; from lack of 
familiarity with the law, judicial processes, and even legal terminology; 
and from lack of confidence in a legal scheme that routinely refuses to af-
ford amends where the pro se feels they are due.  In some cases, the ap-
perception of entitlement to redress is derived from fundamental notions 
of common sense . . . .86 
Pro se litigants seem, in fact, to experience all of the difficulties one 
would expect a layperson would have when going through a highly profes-
sionalized system.  While there are no specific rules of procedure that dis-
criminate against pro se litigants, the nature and design of court procedures 
are such that nonprofessionals would find them difficult to maneuver.  Pro 
se litigants need to deal with a language they do not always understand, 
evidentiary constraints and procedural protocols.  Such rules are not always 
in sync with people’s common sense and social instincts, which are based 
on their behavior and interactions outside the legal sphere.87 
On the other hand, research does evidence possible benefits associated 
with self-representation.  Moreover, while the common perception of pro se 
litigants is that they are forced to represent themselves due to the cost of 
legal services, 88 and would prefer being represented by an attorney,89 there 
 
 83. Id. at 74-76. 
 84. Id. at 71, 73. 
 85. Id. at 60. 
 86. Ira P. Robbins & Susan N. Herman, Litigating Without Counsel: Faretta or for 
Worse, 42 BROOK. L. REV. 629, 644-45 (1975). 
 87. Id. at 655 (“The pro ses’ sensibilities are bruised, for example, by those aspects of 
our legal system that members of the bench and the bar take for granted, such as the normal 
dalliances of juridical operations, adversarial exaggeration and elocution, and alternative 
explanations and interpretations of laws and rules.”). 
 88. Most low-income and moderate-income individuals cannot afford the cost of coun-
sel.  The ABA legal needs study reports that 70-80% of low-income persons are unable to 
obtain legal assistance when they need and want it.  Of these individuals, most do not take 
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are litigants who choose self-representation even when they can afford an 
attorney. 90 
Studies indicate that the most cited reasons for self-representation are: 
inability to pay for an attorney; belief that the matter is simple enough to be 
handled without an attorney; and reluctance to pay the high cost of an at-
torney, despite the ability to pay.91 
We would like to focus our discussion here on two other explanations 
for choosing self representation.  These two explanations—the view of self-
representation as an empowering tool, and the choice of self representation 
because of the low quality of appointed counsel—we find to be particularly 
relevant to our discussion of the various psychological values attached to 
direct or indirect participation. 
One very interesting view of pro se litigation is the view that identifies 
self-representation “as a self-affirming experience that many litigants might 
select precisely because of the personal empowerment that arises from 
maintaining control over the elements of their case.”92  In theory, it is not 
hard to see how pro se litigation has the potential of being an empowering 
and self-affirming tool.  Pro se litigation allows control over the manage-
 
their legal issues to court.  Nearly 71% of the situations affecting low-income households 
that could be addressed by the civil justice system, and 61% of these situations affecting 
moderate-income households, do not get into the court systems.  At the same time, it is not 
clear that the cost of litigation or the lack of access to justice are the reasons for this reality.  
Per their reasons for not turning to the civil justice system, low-income persons interviewed 
displayed “a sense that legal assistance will not help, and fear of the cost.”  The moderate-
income persons were less likely to cite cost considerations than those with low income, but 
they shared the view that “the justice system would not help.”  GOLDSCHMIDT, supra note 
10, at 11.  For more data on low- and moderate-income households’ access to attorneys, see 
Rebecca L. Sandefur, Lawyers’ Pro Bono Services and American-Style Civil Legal Assis-
tance, 41 L. & SOC’Y REV. 79 (2007). 
 89. See, e.g., Russell Engler, And Justice for All—Including the Unrepresented Poor: 
Revisiting the Roles of the Judges, Mediators, and Clerks, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1987, 1992 
(1999). 
 90. Swank reports on a study in which only 31% of the participants said they were pro 
se because they could not afford to hire a lawyer, and almost half implied that they had the 
funds to hire a counsel but chose not to.  Swank, supra note 13, at 378. 
 91. See GREACEN, supra note 11, at 3-4; John M. Greacen, Framing the Issues for the 
Summit on the Future of Self-Representation Litigation, in THE FUTURE OF SELF-
REPRESENTATION LITIGATION: REPORT FROM THE MARCH 2005 SUMMIT 19, 22 (2005).  
Swank lists additional factors including, “increased literacy rates; increased sense of consu-
merism; increased sense of individualism and belief in one’s own abilities; an anti-lawyer 
sentiment; a mistrust of the legal system; a belief that the public defender in criminal cases 
is overburdened; a belief that the court will do what is right whether  the party is represented 
or not; a belief that litigation has been simplified to the point that attorneys are not needed, 
and, a trial strategy designed to gain either sympathy or a procedural advantage over 
represented parties.”  Swank, supra note 13, at 378-79. 
 92. Scott Barclay, The Decision to Self-Represent, 77 SOC. SCI. Q. 912, 913 (1996). 
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ment of one’s case and pro se litigants can choose how to present the case 
and which aspects to stress.  Their participation in the court procedure is 
active and direct.  Again, in theory at least, self representation can serve to 
solve many of the difficulties and sources of dissatisfaction that character-
ize the legal experiences of represented litigants (the feeling of passivity 
and lack of control, the inability to tell one’s story, or the difficulty of 
communicating with lawyers). 
In reality, as the data presented here shows, for most pro se litigants, 
self-representation does not prove to be such a positive experience.  Evi-
dence that individuals benefited from pro se representation on a personal 
level is merely anecdotal.  Much of this evidence comes from discussions 
of the informal dispute resolution literature, which involves procedures 
such as mediation that may not be relevant to the courts. 
Some interesting evidence comes out of interviews with ten women who 
represented themselves through their divorces, with some out of court as-
sistance from a law clinic.93  The women who derived the most from their 
pro se experiences attributed their satisfaction to the fact that they them-
selves were in control over the legal process and that they found the 
process to be less complicated than they had imagined before they entered 
into it.  These women said they felt better about themselves and felt more 
competent in other areas of their lives following their pro se experiences.94  
For example, one woman described the change: “I used to be scared to do 
new tasks at work; I’d always have to stop and ask my supervisor lots of 
questions.  Now I just plunge right in!  She also noticed that she is more as-
sertive, and speaks out more often in her night school classes.”95 
At the same time, and despite what was overall a positive experience, 
three of the women thought that having a lawyer would have been better.  
They believed the process would have been quicker and that they would 
have preserved more rights had they been represented.  “One woman ac-
knowledged honestly that ‘doing things yourself is just another burden of 
being poor.  Sure, if I had money I’d hire a lawyer.’”96  When asked 
whether they would go pro se again in other legal proceedings, four of the 
women said no, while the other six said they would attempt pro se litigation 
in future cases.97  It is important to note, however, with regard to the expe-
rience of the women interviewed, that although they represented them-
 
 93. Emily Joselson & Judy Kaye, Pro Se Divorce: A Strategy for Empowering Women, 
1 LAW & INEQ. 239 (1983). 
 94. See id. at 245, 249. 
 95. Id. at 248. 
 96. Id. at 253. 
 97. Id. at 254. 
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selves, they also enjoyed legal advice and support through participation in 
the clinic.  As one of them described the process, “I really like doing my 
divorce alone – with help!”98  In that sense, their experience is not quite the 
typical pro se experience, since many pro se litigants have no access to any 
professional legal advice.99 
In a study of pro se divorce litigants in Arizona, 70% of those facing 
self-represented opponents said they would choose to represent themselves 
in the future.  Out of those pro se litigants whose opponents had attorneys, 
only 36% said they would choose self-representation again in the future.100 
Another study, focusing on a group of ninety-five civil appellants in Illi-
nois, Minnesota, and Mississippi, 27% of which were pro se, suggests that 
some of the litigants had chosen to appeal without a lawyer “as part of a le-
gal strategy to force the courts to deal with the issue that the litigants, rather 
than the legal system, identify as at the heart of their disputes.”101  Yet, liti-
gants in this study were not asked directly about their decision to represent 
themselves.  The author drew this conclusion from the general feeling, re-
vealed in the interviews “that the primary issue in their case was not among 
the issues discussed by the court,”102 or promoted by their lawyers.  The 
author infers from this data that a possible strategy for litigants to use to 
overcome this difficulty is self-representation, which allows litigants “the 
ability to place directly before the court the issues that they identified as 
most salient.”103  This observation accords with our prior argument that one 
benefit of self-representation is the ability to shape the nature of the argu-
ments presented to the legal decision-maker.  At the same time, and as the 
author recognized, it is not clear at all whether self-representation is a suc-
cessful strategy in that respect. 
It appears that the short-term advantage of redefining the legal focus of 
their case might have been purchased at the expense of the long-term le-
gal consequences. Although self-representation gives litigants the ability 
to restrict legal transformation of their issues, the result of such control 
may be that the litigants are no longer able to fit their claims with the ex-
isting legal parameters.104 
This observation resonates with the findings of Conley and O’Barr in 
their study of self-represented litigants in small claims courts.  They define 
 
 98. Id. at 248. 
 99. Swank, supra note 13, at 382. 
 100. GREACEN, supra note 11, at 4. 
 101. Barclay, supra note 92, at 912. 
 102. Id. at 917. 
 103. Id. at 919. 
 104. Id. at 920. 
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this difficulty in terms of the legal inadequacy of pro se litigants’ narra-
tives.  They found that while the opportunity to tell their story without evi-
dential constraints increased litigants’ satisfaction with the court proce-
dures, it also harmed other interests.  Presenting the claims in everyday 
language and structure, those narratives often lacked the required compo-
nents of legally adequate claims, which often resulted in losing the case.105 
Another possible motivation for proceeding pro se, of particular relev-
ance to our discussion, is dissatisfaction with the quality of legal represen-
tation.  A study of pro se defendants in felony cases suggests that many of 
them chose to represent themselves because of dissatisfaction with the 
counsel appointed to them as well as concerns regarding the quality of that 
representation.106  From the pro se defendants in the database who had 
counsel at the beginning of the process, more than half had asked the judge 
to appoint them a new counsel before they decided to proceed pro se.107  In 
addition, the study found that defendants with court-appointed counsel 
were more likely to choose to represent themselves than federal felony de-
fendants as a whole.108  The data indicates two possible reasons for dissa-
tisfaction with counsel: the poor quality of court-appointed counsel (which 
is a result of budgetary deficiencies and huge caseloads) and ideological 
reasons that made these defendants mistrust the court-appointed attorney 
(many of the pro se defendants were accused of felonies carrying some 
ideological character, such as tax evasion).109 
The data also shows that pro se defendants were more likely to go to trial 
than represented defendants.110  This finding is used in this research to sup-
port the claim that concerns with attorney quality were the reason these li-
tigants chose pro se litigation.  At the same time, the correlation between 
the choice to go to trial and the choice to proceed pro se might also indicate 
that these individuals attribute more importance to voice opportunities. 
Are defendants’ concerns about the quality of representation legitimate?  
Certainly in some cases they are.  It is not hard to find examples and evi-
dence of lawyers, court-appointed and private, who provide their clients 
with a less than adequate level of legal services.  Lawyers’ negligence in 
 
 105. JOHN M. CONLEY & WILLIAM M. O’BARR, RULES VERSUS RELATIONSHIPS: THE ETH-
NOGRAPHY OF LEGAL DISCOURSE 35-49 (1990). 
 106. Erica J. Hashimoto, Defending the Right of Self-Representation: An Empirical Look 
at the Pro Se Felony Defendant, 85 N.C. L. REV. 423, 429 (2007). 
 107. Id. at 461 (“[Sixteen percent] of them had made the decision to proceed pro se while 
they were represented by an attorney with whom they had publicly expressed dissatisfac-
tion.”). 
 108. Id. at 465. 
 109. Id. at 428-30. 
 110. Id. at 447. 
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representation, while almost never recognized as such by the court, certain-
ly has the potential to harm their clients.111  When speaking of court-
appointed counsel in criminal cases: 
[T]here also is ample evidence that defendants have a basis for being con-
cerned about counsel – the quality of court-appointed counsel is breathta-
kingly low in many jurisdictions.  While all jurisdictions are constitution-
ally required to provide a lawyer to indigent defendants, many do not 
provide good counsel . . . . The deficiencies in the quality of court-
appointed counsel result both from a lack of sufficient funding and from 
problems in the structure used to provide counsel to indigent defendants.  
Public defender systems often work with extremely limited resources.  At-
torneys are saddled with crushing caseloads and are unable to represent 
their clients adequately because of the sheer volume of cases for which 
they are responsible.112 
It is important to remember these facts when comparing the experiences 
of represented and unrepresented litigants, since the quality of the represen-
tation is an important factor. The court, for example, says “Our experience 
has taught us that ‘a pro se defense is usually a bad defense, particularly 
when compared to a defense provided by an experienced criminal defense 
attorney.’”113  But what if pro se litigation is compared to representation by 
an inexperienced lawyer, or representation by a lawyer whose caseload 
does not allow him to devote the minimum required time to the case?  Is 
representation always better?  Or, can we identify a certain level of legal 
services which is so poor that it justifies the decision to represent oneself? 
D. Does it Matter if People are Denied Access to a Lawyer? 
Not having a lawyer is not the same thing as wanting a lawyer and being 
unable to have one for some reason, particularly as a result of cost.  The 
2005 California study also asked people about the costs of having a law-
yer—in particular, residents were asked if the cost of hiring an attorney 
kept, or might keep them from going to court.  Of those interviewed, 69% 
indicated that attorney cost had or might prevent them from going to 
court.114  This question combines two issues: whether costs might make it 
more difficult to hire an attorney, and whether the lack of an attorney might 
make it more difficult to go to court.  Likely, there are at least some people 
 
 111. RHODE, supra note 16, at 11-14. 
 112. Hashimoto, supra note 106, at 567-70. 
 113. Martinez v. Court of Appeal, 528 U.S. 152, 161 (2000) (quoting John F. Decker, 
The Sixth Amendment Right to Shoot Oneself in the Foot, 6 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 483, 
487 (1996)) (discussed in Hashimoto, supra note 106, at 446-47). 
 114. ROTTMAN, supra note 10, at 19-20. 
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who feel unable to hire an attorney, but who would be able to go to court 
without one. 
Does the perception that one can not afford an attorney matter, and con-
sequently, does it matter that one is less able to go to court?  In the Califor-
nia study, those who indicated that they might not be able to go to court 
due to attorney costs indicated that the courts performed less well (r = .15); 
that the courts were less satisfactory institutions (r = .11); that the courts 
were less procedurally just (r = .14); and that they had less confidence in 
the court system (r = .09).  Hence, in this study, thinking that one lacked 
access to justice due to prohibitive attorney costs is related to a variety of 
negative evaluations of the court system.115 
Another group of potential interest is litigants who could afford or oth-
erwise have access to an attorney, but who nevertheless decide to represent 
themselves.  While studies indicate that there are litigants who choose to 
represent themselves even though they can afford to hire a lawyer, there is 
no data that distinguishes the experiences of these litigants from those who 
represent themselves out of necessity, and at this time we cannot comment 
upon how these litigants experience going to court. 
CONCLUSION 
The experience that litigants have when they deal with the legal system 
is important because it shapes their willingness to accept decisions and 
their evaluations of the legal system.  Extensive psychological literature ex-
ists to point to the issues that influence litigants and to the procedural ele-
ments that are key to people’s reactions.  That literature suggests that 
people care about the fairness of the procedures used to deal with the prob-
lems that bring them into court.  From this procedural justice framework 
we argue that structural changes in the legal system, such as the provision 
of counsel in civil cases, should be evaluated from the perspective of how 
those changes influence the experience of litigants. 
Our analysis of the psychology of pro se litigation began with a recogni-
tion that having an opportunity to be represented in the litigation process, 
often referred to as having voice, is central to people’s subjective reactions 
to that experience.  If people feel represented, they indicate that the proce-
dure is more neutral, they feel more respect, and they indicate higher levels 
of trust in the decision-maker.  Further, whether people feel represented in 
the litigation shapes their satisfaction, their willingness to accept the deci-
sions made, and their evaluations of law and legal authorities more general-
 
 115. Id. at 22.  The data from this paper has been reanalyzed by the authors of this paper 
for the analysis reported.  Tyler & Rottman, supra note 34. 
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ly.  Hence, it is important to consider how the form of legal participation 
shapes people’s feelings about voice—and in particular, in what way it 
matters if people have or do not have a lawyer. 
Our review reveals that there is not a great deal of empirical research 
addressing questions resulting from access to counsel.  Moreover, the exist-
ing data presents some contradictory findings.  One general impression 
from this review is that current research fails to capture and measure the 
quality of individuals’ legal experiences.  People’s evaluations of legal pro-
cedures in which they participated are determined, eventually, by the quali-
ty of the legal representation they had or the quality of the treatment they 
received from the judge or other court personnel.  It is difficult to compare 
the experience of a person who had a zealous lawyer with that of a litigant 
who had an attorney who provided a less than satisfactory level of repre-
sentation.  It is similarly complicated to compare the experience of these 
two litigants with that of a pro se litigant, in order to draw general conclu-
sions about self representation more generally.  Future research should aim 
to overcome these obstacles in assessing individuals’ legal experiences.  
Meanwhile, any conclusions or recommendations regarding the provision 
of a lawyer as a means to increased access to justice should take into ac-
count the quality of legal representation that could be offered. 
There are still, however, several conclusions that can be drawn from 
what we know at this time. 
A. The Denial of Access to the Courts 
One clear finding is that the feeling of being denied access to the system, 
due to lack of financial resources to consult with and retain counsel, clearly 
leads to negative feelings about the courts and the law.  In addition, the in-
ability to obtain legal representation for financial reasons decreases the 
number of people who go to court and, as a consequence, lowers the gener-
al level at which legal grievances are represented in court.  Provision of 
counsel is likely to improve public views of the courts and the law by les-
sening the number of potential litigants who feel that they are not able to 
pursue their claims because they lack the financial resources to do so. 
B. The Psychology of Representation 
One of the primary concerns emerging from an examination of the psy-
chological literature on representation is that people might prefer direct 
participation.  That argument flows from the suggestion that people value 
direct interaction with the decision-maker for two reasons: first, because it 
allows them to tell their side of the story and present their own evidence; 
second, because the attention of authorities provides direct evidence that 
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the decision-maker is listening to and considering their arguments.  This is 
reassuring.  It reinforces the belief that authorities are benevolent and, fur-
ther, are concerned about the problems of ordinary citizens. 
In view of these possible benefits associated with direct interaction with 
authority figures and voice, the question is whether individuals are less able 
to experience that sense of control and less likely to feel listened to if the 
communication occurs through an attorney.  Based upon the research re-
viewed, we saw that overall, having or not having an attorney is not gener-
ally associated with changes in litigants’ feeling that they have a voice in 
the litigation process.  Fears that representation by an attorney will under-
mine the satisfaction associated with directly presenting one’s side of the 
case are not supported by currently available evidence.  As mentioned be-
fore, given the importance of voice this is an important finding.  Converse-
ly though, there is no evidence that providing people with an attorney will 
increase their feeling of having voice.  The potential advantages of having 
legal representation are not manifested in enhancing litigants’ satisfaction 
with their level of participation and voice.  There are, however, other ad-
vantages related to legal representation. 
In reviewing the currently available literature, we found a number of 
anecdotal suggestions about potential consequences of representation by an 
attorney.  One commonly noted consequence of legal representation is that 
people usually feel that they understand the procedures used and the deci-
sions made better if they have a trained and experienced lawyer 
representing them.  Litigants with lawyers frequently feel that they better 
understand the law and legal procedures than do those litigants who 
represent themselves.  As a consequence, the litigation experience is often 
generally a more satisfying experience when people are represented by a 
lawyer.  It is clear, however, that this is not always the case, and some liti-
gants react positively to the challenges posed by pro se litigation.  This 
might also not be true of cases where the attorney does not provide clients 
with the appropriate information and guidance.  Our conclusions regarding 
provision of attorney assume adequate level of representation. 
Overall, we know that pro se litigants experience a lot of frustration in 
court but at the same time we have a large body of evidence showing that 
represented litigants can also feel lack of control or involvement with their 
own case which leads to frustration as well.  There is a need for future re-
search to directly address the different psychological effects of direct and 
mediated participation.  Additional research is also required in order to de-
termine how the different procedural values are ranked and balanced by in-
dividuals.  For example, how do people compare voice opportunities (direct 
or mediated), control, or understanding of the legal procedures with the se-
curity and reassurance provided by a professional?  Or, how do individuals 
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balance the opportunity to completely control the management of their 
case, with the difficulties they face as outsiders in a professional system? 
C. Potential Changes in the Legal System 
In considering the benefits and costs of pro se litigation, some aspects of 
the legal system need to be mentioned.  The first is the quality of legal re-
presentation.  The impact of the provision of counsel in and of itself is un-
likely to have an influence.  By retaining counsel, people lose their oppor-
tunity to directly represent themselves. Therefore, the quality of their 
experience will depend upon the quality of their legal representation, rela-
tive to what the litigant might have been able, or at least imagines he might 
have been able, to accomplish himself.  To improve the quality of legal re-
presentation the organized bar needs to support training in lawyering tech-
niques.  It is equally important to provide the resources that allow attorneys 
the time to be effective advocates for their clients, something that the pro-
vision of access to counsel should help to do. 
The form of legal procedure is also relevant.  Irrespective of whether li-
tigants are provided counsel, it is crucial that their concerns about receiving 
a fair process are addressed.  As we have noted, the current litigation sys-
tem does not provide opportunities for involvement and voice once litigants 
are represented by counsel.  Conversely, while the court system has taken 
serious strides to address the pro se phenomenon,116 many traditional court 
systems still do too little to aid those litigants who do not have attorneys to 
master and navigate the complexity of the courthouse.  Further, judges vary 
in the degree to which they are willing to aid pro se litigants trying to make 
legally relevant arguments in support of their cases.  Procedures need to be 
modified to correct both of these problems. 
As an example of creating opportunities for voice, courts have accom-
modated victim statements at sentencing hearings.  While victims have no 
legal standing to speak before those convicted of crimes against them are 
sentenced, many jurisdictions provide them with opportunities for voice.  
In a similar vein, legal authorities should consider ways that represented 
litigants can be given opportunities for voice.  One example, already men-
tioned, is the use of more informal procedures such as mediation.  Or, 
judges may simply allow represented litigants to have some opportunities 
to directly address them, to speak to the jury, and or to participate in dis-
cussions about the evidence. 
 
 116. See Greacen, supra note 91, at 22 (reviewing extensively the many programs devel-
oped in the court system to assist pro se litigants). 
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The accommodation of courts to pro se litigation is already ongoing.  
The courts have created help desks in courthouses, offices whose function 
is to provide legal guidance and to explain court procedures, and translation 
services that enable people to more effectively communicate with judges 
and other court personnel.  These accommodations reflect the simple reality 
that pro se litigation is increasing in frequency and must be dealt with in 
some way by the courts, in addition to any attempt to increase access to 
counsel. 
